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The Persuasive Force of Political Humor 
 
Political humor is ubiquitous in some contexts and forbidden in others, indicating belief 
that humor has persuasive force and affects the legitimacy of political institutions and political 
participation (Hart & Hartelius, 2007; Hariman, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2012). And yet scholars have 
described political humor as not “a reliable tool” (Laineste, 2013, p. 489) and “[a]ttempts to 
control or fix its meaning [as] futile” (Rossing, 2012, p. 53). These circumstances beg the 
questions: How do speakers design political humor to influence audiences, and why do they 
expect those designs to work? To answer these questions, we analyze the persuasive design of 
political humor in Anna Howard Shaw’s (1915a) “The Fundamental Principle of a Republic,” a 
paradigm case of civic speech advocating political action. Shaw deploys political humor as part 
of a broader campaign to influence male voters in New York to vote “yes” on a referendum to 
change the state constitution to permit women to vote. We argue that Shaw designs persuasive 
political humor by making visible her intent and undertaking obligations to act in accord with 
specific norms. We explain how her designs constrain voters from discounting the message as 
just a joke and create reasons to scrutinize arguments. 
To make the case, we first review social scientific and rhetorical theories of political 
humor in order to specify how integrating communication design theory (Aakhus, 2007; Jackson 
& Aakhus, 2014) and normative pragmatic theory (Goodwin, 2011; Innocenti, 2011; Jacobs, 
2000) complements them. We then describe a basic model of the persuasive force of 
communication design strategies. We use the model to analyze how Shaw designs political 





Social scientific and rhetorical accounts of political humor 
Political humor can take any number of forms including jokes, satire, ridicule, parody, 
and cartoons, and can be deployed in any number of contexts, such as late-night entertainment 
television, presidential debates, and political demonstrations.1 We base our inquiry on a 
campaign speech designed to influence voters to vote “yes” on a referendum to change a state 
constitution. A core strategy of campaign speeches is reason-giving; it would be incoherent to 
say, “I urge you to vote ‘yes’ on the referendum, but I cannot give you reasons why you ought to 
vote ‘yes.’” We assume that speakers deploy political humor to enhance the conditions for the 
favorable reception of their arguments (Jacobs, 2000).  
At the same time, cognitive-response-based research suggests that political humor can 
reduce individuals’ motivation or ability to scrutinize arguments. Reduced motivation has been 
explained by the discounting cue hypothesis: Receivers may discount the message as “just a 
joke” (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, & Byrne, 2007) and so have lower motivation to scrutinize arguments. 
Reduced ability has been explained by the resource allocation theory: Receivers may allocate so 
much cognitive effort to processing the humor that they have fewer cognitive resources and 
therefore lower ability to scrutinize arguments (Young, 2008). LaMarre, Landreville, Young, and 
Gilkerson (2014) have followed Polk, Young, and Holbert (2009) in describing different 
implications for agency based on whether the discounting cue hypothesis or resource allocation 
theory accounts for why message receivers do not scrutinize humorous political arguments. They 
posit that the discounting cue hypothesis assigns agency to the receiver to decide whether the 
humorous political argument deserves serious scrutiny. They hold that the resource allocation 
hypothesis assigns most of the agency to the creator who decides how complex and therefore 
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cognitively draining a humorous political argument ought to be. 
However, the reverse account of agency is equally plausible. First, in the case of the 
discounting cue hypothesis, a measure of agency remains in the hands of the creator to design a 
humorous political argument that pressures receivers to take it seriously. For example, a creator 
could counteract discounting of a humorous message by designing a conclusion that reestablishes 
serious intent (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, & Byrne, 2007). Second, in the case of the resource allocation 
theory, even if the humor is complex, receivers can decide the arguments deserve scrutiny and 
allocate effort to scrutinize them. Consequently, we generate a model of the persuasive force of 
political humor that distributes agency between senders and receivers, one that accounts for how 
senders can design political humor to influence receivers, including individuals who are short on 
motivation or ability to scrutinize arguments. 
Understanding how individuals cognitively process political humor does not fully explain 
how political humor is designed to influence audiences and coordinate public action. First, 
individual cognitions may be irrelevant to public action. Laineste (2013) has noted the tenuous 
link between reactions to jokes and actual attitudes and behaviors. For example, a woman may 
not display that she is offended by a sexist joke, because “traditionally, women have been 
expected to identify with comedy which insults us, so as to ‘belong,’ to be seen as having a sense 
of humor and the shared values this sensibility implies” (Merrill, 1988, p. 274). In addition, any 
number of contextual variables needs to be taken into account in order to predict how individuals 
will respond to a humorous political message. When joke tellers justify flops with, “I guess you 
had to be there,” they indicate the weight of context (Lengbeyer, 2005, p. 320). And as Meyer 
(2000) has noted, “attempts at humor that meet with success depend directly on the specific 
audience and the situation in question” (p. 316). For example, “[a] male-identified audience may 
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not perceive feminist humor to be amusing, just as a feminist audience may not perceive sexist 
humor to be amusing. Other audience variables, such as race and sexuality, are equally relevant 
to an audience’s interpretation of an[d] response to attempts at humor” (Shugart, 2001, p. 98). 
The deeply situational nature of humor may account for inconsistent findings about the 
persuasive effects of humorous messages generally (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; O’Keefe, 2002), 
and the apparently “minimal” persuasive effects of political satire specifically (Holbert, 2013, p. 
310).  
Analysis of situated deployments of strategies is a traditional domain of rhetorical theory. 
Rhetorical theories of humor describe broad functions that strategies can potentially perform. In 
this branch of theorizing, Meyer (2000; see also Martin, 2004; Rhea, 2012) has provided a 
comprehensive and parsimonious approach to analyzing functions of political humor. Meyer 
(2000) has argued that rhetors use humor to perform two basic functions—unification and 
division—resulting in “four ‘theories of use,’ or key functions of humor in messages” (p. 311): 
identification (building support by identifying message creators with their audiences), 
clarification (encapsulating message creators’ views in memorable forms), enforcement (leveling 
criticism while maintaining a degree of identification with the audience), and differentiation 
(contrasting message creators with opponents, or some views or social groups from other views 
or social groups). Meyer’s (2000) theory describes broad functions of a wide range of political 
humor. But any rhetorical transaction can be theorized in terms of unification and division. If 
there were either absolute unification or absolute division, there would be no strife, and thus no 
need for rhetoric. It is precisely in the ambiguity of unification and division—the unspecifiability 
of where one ends and the other begins—that there is an invitation to rhetoric (Burke, 1969). 
Descriptions of broad, potential functions of political humor do not explain how speakers 
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actually design humor to influence situated audiences and coordinate public action. 
Ridicule is a humor style that can also be described in terms of the broad, potential 
functions of unification and division. Ridicule is divisive humor that simultaneously unifies 
(Meyer, 2000). Ridiculing generally involves impugning others’ conduct and making them the 
butt of the joke, so it performs additional functions. First, it performs a “hierarchization” 
function as it “reflects and reinforces a dynamic of status ascription within a given domain of 
social interaction” (Cowan, 2005, para. 33). Second, it performs a “stabilization” function as it 
“preempts or reduces deviance within both the aggressor group and the aggressor audience” 
(Cowan, 2005, para. 33). But this kind of broad, functional account does not explain how 
speakers design ridicule to influence situated social actors, and at the same time constrain them 
from dismissing the ridicule as irrelevant, mean-spirited, or untrue. 
How speakers design messages to influence audiences to “take” political humor in 
specific ways deserves scholarly attention. Humor is a slippery strategy precisely because of the 
ambiguity and wiggle room that it affords. Speakers may design political humor to create a 
carnivalesque context in which they can insult or challenge authority with impunity (Hariman, 
2008; Meddaugh, 2010; Turton-Turner, 2007). They do so by leaving themselves wiggle room to 
duck behind a “just joking” or “lighten up” defense, thus putting the audience at risk of criticism 
for not having a sense of humor (Bing, 2004; Case & Lippard, 2009). But, other things being 
equal, if speakers leave themselves wiggle room to discount their message as just a joke, the 
audience is also free to discount it with impunity. Presumably, speakers make special efforts to 
influence how audiences “take” humor, perhaps designing humor to constrain audiences from 
discounting their message as just a joke. Analyzing these special efforts heeds the call for 
“[e]xploring the conditions under which [persuasive] effects are likely to occur, particularly in 
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more naturalistic environments” (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, & Byrne, 2007, p. 51), and supplements 
rhetorical accounts of broad functions of political humor by explaining the persuasive design of 
situated political humor. 
 
Communication design and normative pragmatic theory 
To account for the persuasive force of political humor, we follow researchers such as 
Jackson (1998), Jacobs (2000, 2006), and Tracy (2012) in conceiving context as 
communicatively designed. Consciously or not, communicators deploy strategies to enhance the 
conditions for the favorable reception and influence of their messages (Jacobs, 2000). In what 
follows, we outline normative pragmatic theory and the assumptions it shares with 
communication design theory (Aakhus, 2007). Integrating communication design theory and 
normative pragmatic theory can account for the persuasive force of political humor. Both explain 
how communicators deploy strategies to design a context where even reluctant audiences—
individuals short on motivation or ability to act—are influenced to act as the speaker intends. 
This mode of theory construction is based on the assumption that “designs for communication 
embody theories of communication and [that] communication-design work is an activity of 
theorizing communication” (Aakhus, 2007, p. 115). Our goal is not to recommend 
communication redesign but instead to explain how speakers design political humor to 
coordinate public action. Articulating a speaker’s design theory is based on the assumption that 
“[c]ommunication design is natural, describable activity that is evident in ordinary 
communicators’ creativity in language use and capacity to exploit mutual knowledge and 
principles of interaction” (Aakhus, 2007, p. 113). 
Jackson and Aakhus (2014) have described communication design theory as a third way 
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of knowing that supplements and bridges empirical and humanistic accounts of communication. 
Likewise, the term “normative pragmatic” was first used by van Eemeren (1990) to describe a 
mode of theorizing that aims to transcend purely normative and purely descriptive approaches to 
argumentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993). The account is 
“normative” because it accounts for persuasive influence based on norms that strategies bring to 
bear in a situation, and “pragmatic” because it refers to actual communication practices. 
Normative pragmatic theories have been developed to account for the persuasive force of speech 
acts such as proposing and accusing, and for design features including graphics and appeals to 
authority and fear (Goodwin, 2002, 2011; Innocenti, 2011; Jacobs, 2000, 2006; Kauffeld, 1998, 
2001, 2009). 
The basic normative pragmatic model comprises reasoning that accounts for why 
speakers can expect design strategies to influence audiences. 
1. A strategy changes the context by making visible the speaker’s (a) intent and (b) 
concomitant obligation to live up to some norm. 
2. The obligation is reciprocal. Both speaker and audience can hold each other 
accountable for seeing the norm and living up to it. 
3. As a result, the strategy creates two reasons to be influenced. 
a. The audience can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism for failing to 
meet the obligation unless she planned to live up to it. 
b. The speaker can reason that the audience will be influenced in order to avoid 
criticism for failing to live up to the obligation. 
To illustrate the basic model, consider why theater personnel can expect the design strategy of 
setting up a line divider to influence even patrons who are short on motivation or ability to line 
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up. The line divider changes the context by making visible (a) theater personnel’s intent and (b) 
concomitant obligation to act in accord with norms of queuing. The line divider creates two 
reasons for patrons to line up. First, it licenses patrons to presume theater personnel would not 
set up a line divider unless they intended to act in accord with norms of queuing. In ordinary 
circumstances, theater personnel cannot plausibly, coherently deny the intent or obligation. If 
ticket-takers let their friends move to the front of the line, other patrons could justifiably say, 
“Jerks!” and perhaps even disregard the line divider and enter en masse. The obligation to act in 
accord with norms of queuing is reciprocal. Making intent visible and undertaking an obligation 
to act in accord with norms of queuing constrains patrons from ignoring the line divider. In 
ordinary circumstances they cannot say with impunity, “I didn’t know there was a line” or “I 
didn’t see the line.” Thus, the line divider creates a second reason for them to be influenced: To 
avoid being called jerks and to display that they are acting fairly, patrons can line up. The same 
basic model explains why the design strategy of saying, “Line up!” influences patrons to line up.  
Of course both personnel and patrons can accept risks of criticism and disregard norms of 
queuing, or try to explain why the norms do not apply in the circumstances. Persuasive force is 
not compulsion. But attempts to resist or dodge persuasive force indicate that design strategies 
have generated persuasive force.  
To show that the model accounts for the persuasive force of political humor, we analyze 
designs of political humor that constrain audiences from discounting the message as a whole as 
just a joke, and that influence them to take seriously some instances of humor and to not take 




To illustrate the explanatory power of a normative pragmatic model of persuasive force, 
we analyze the design of a well-circumscribed, widely-circulated case of complex 
communication, renowned for humor, designed to influence voters. Anna Howard Shaw 
delivered “her masterpiece" (Campbell 1989, p. 159), “The Fundamental Principle of a 
Republic,” many times in many venues, and a transcript of this speech was published in the 
Ogdensburg Advance and St. Lawrence Weekly Democrat. Shaw’s performances are tiles in the 
“mosaic” (Becker 1971, p. 33) of public messages comprising campaigns for and against the 
New York state referendum to change the state constitution to permit women to vote. In this 
speech, Shaw designs political humor to influence male voters to vote “yes” on the referendum. 
What is her design theory? Why does she expect her designs to influence voters? 
We base our account on both Shaw’s talk and her “talk about talk” (Craig, 2005)—her 
metadiscourse about how her strategies are designed to influence voters. As Jackson and Aakhus 
(2014) have noted, good design work is reflective. Situated social actors may explicitly reflect on 
why their messages ought to influence other social actors. Our analysis of metadiscourse is based 
on the assumption that “[e]ach design for communication hypothesizes how communication 
works and how it ought to work through its affordances and constraints” (Aakhus, 2007, p. 114; 
Aakhus & Laureij, 2012). To identify affordances and constraints, we reconstruct the 
communicative context based primarily on the February 7, 1915 anti-suffrage editorial in the 
New York Times and the six pages, eight columns each, of letters to the editor in response to it. 
We supplement these sources with other newspapers and periodicals that include messages 
available to readers who want to be able to say they are well-informed about political issues. 
These sources also include reflections about why specific message designs ought to influence 
voters.  
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We focus on how Shaw designs ridicule, because ridicule is the characteristic form of 
humor she uses. For example, in her autobiography published during the 1915 referendum 
campaign, Shaw (1915c) recalls what she describes as an “amusing” reply by an anti-suffragist 
to a suffragist’s challenge to a debate: The anti-suffragist “declined the challenge, explaining that 
for anti-suffragists to appear upon a public platform would be a direct violation of the principle 
for which they stood—which was the protection of female modesty! Recalling this, and the 
present hectic activity of the anti-suffragists, one must feel that they have either abandoned their 
principle or widened their views” (p. 154). Shaw makes the same point in an April 1915 speech 
in Alabama: “When I was in the campaign last year, I was followed from place to place by an 
anti-suffrage speaker from New Jersey. She was a very agreeable young woman who had left her 
husband and home and gone forth to tell women that their place is at home, that they have not 
time to vote, and that they must not go out in public because it is unwomanly!” (Shaw, 1915b, p. 
230). Two months later in “The Fundamental Principle of a Republic,” Shaw (1915a) mentions 
the New Jersey anti-suffragist again: “She left her husband home for three months to tell the 
women that their place was at home, and that they could not leave home long enough to go to the 
ballot box” (p. 451). What a reviewer of Alice Duer Miller’s 1915 book of poems ridiculing anti-
suffrage arguments writes about Miller could have been written about Shaw: “[H]er perception 
of the absurd [. . .] will afford cause for merriment among those who are on her side of the 
suffrage argument. Those who are on the other side are likely to feel different about it” (“Are 
women people,” 1915). Nonetheless, a newspaper account of a later speech reports, “Dr. Shaw 
read from anti-suffrage literature and raised many a laugh” (“Mayor,” 1915). Shaw certainly 
intended to influence audiences to appreciate the unintended humor of self-contradictory anti-




Designing political humor to constrain discounting of the speech as a whole 
Opponents of woman suffrage attempted to discount the advocacy of “[t]he average 
suffragist of the present day” who is “merely a chronic seeker of the ‘limelight’” (“Like the 
‘limelight,’” 1915; “Vast majority opposed,” 1915). Seeking the limelight is such a serious 
criticism that even suffrage advocate Carrie Chapman Catt (1915) charges anti-suffragists with 
standing “[i]n the center of the stage where the limelight is most brilliant.” Shaw may have been 
particularly vulnerable to message discounting on these grounds. Advance notices of her 1915 
speeches report, “Dr. Shaw is famous for her wit. Her speeches abound with humor, and her 
audience is promised not only one of the most enlightening speeches on a vital question but one 
of the most enjoyable” (“Dr. Anna H. Shaw,” 1915); and Shaw “is famous for her humor. Her 
audiences always declare they have a better time, listening to her speeches, than when attending 
the best theatres, and that she is as enjoyable as she is interesting” (“Mass meeting in Newark,” 
1915; see also “Local items,” 1915; “Mass meeting to-night,” 1915). Following the referendum 
campaign, one periodical summarizes her style: “Subtle humor, quick wit, broad sympathy, 
intense conviction, keen sense of justice, and sharp thrust of satire have been her chosen fighting 
weapons” (“Anna Howard Shaw, inveterate,” 1915). What design strategies does Shaw deploy to 
constrain voters from discounting her political humor as mere spectacle? The key features are 
making visible (1) her intent to persuade men to vote for woman suffrage and (2) concomitant 
obligation to make a responsible case.  
 Shaw (1915a) begins her speech by asserting that she came to the same venue twenty-one 
years ago “for exactly the same purpose”: “to persuade American men to believe in the 
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fundamental principles of democracy,” to coax “the men of New York” to take advantage of “the 
greatest opportunity which has ever come to the men of the state,” and on November 2, to make 
“this state truly a part of a Republic” (p. 434). Anyone who wanted to lay claim to keeping 
informed would know from reading newspapers that Shaw intended to influence men to vote for 
woman suffrage. Upon her return to New York after campaigning for suffrage in other states, the 
New York Tribune reports that Shaw would give 120 speeches as “her gift to the referendum 
fights in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania” (“Suffrage calendar,” 1915), 
and quotes Shaw’s statement of purpose for the campaign: “The men are the ones who will vote 
on this question . . . I am out to convert them” (“Suffrage day,” 1915). 
Why does Shaw bother stating her obvious intent? That design strategy displays both her 
intent to persuade men to vote “yes” and concomitant obligation to make a responsible case for 
the position. Just as it would be incoherent for theater personnel to set up a line divider and 
disclaim an obligation to act in accord with norms of queuing, so it would be incoherent for 
Shaw to say, “I intend to persuade you to vote ‘yes,’ but I will not make a responsible case for 
it.” Although a woman speaking to promiscuous (mixed-gender) audiences may have been less 
controversial in 1915 than in the previous century (Zaeske, 1995), women still risked criticism 
for trying to influence men. Even a supporter of woman suffrage leveraged the position that 
women who try to influence men act immodestly: Arguing that women are not already 
represented by men, the writer asserts, “Some women are too modest and refined to try to 
‘influence’ men, so that the majority of women are not represented as they wish to be” 
(Beerbower, 1915).  
Shaw’s statement of intent creates two reasons for voters to take her overall message 
seriously and to scrutinize her arguments. First, they can presume Shaw will discharge the 
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obligation to make a responsible case, and not immodestly make a spectacle of herself. Shaw’s 
entire speech is designed to discharge that obligation; one report describes it as “one of the finest 
forensic pleadings ever listened to in Ogdensburg” (“Dr. Anna Shaw,” 1915). The obligation is 
reciprocal. Just as a line divider constrains theater patrons from ignoring norms of queuing and 
affords them the possibility of displaying fairness, so too does undertaking and discharging an 
obligation to make a responsible case constrain voters from dismissing the message as mere 
spectacle and afford them the possibility of displaying responsible voting. The strategy creates a 
context in which even uninformed, disengaged voters could not attend or read the speech and 
dismiss it with impunity as mere spectacle. Thus the statement of intent creates a second reason 
for voters to take the overall message seriously: To avoid criticism for irresponsible voting, they 
can scrutinize the arguments. 
Shaw’s metadiscourse indicates her design theory, or why she expects that undertaking 
and discharging the obligation to make a responsible case will influence voters to scrutinize 
arguments. Shaw (1915a) states, “[A]ny man who goes to the polls on the second day of next 
November without thoroughly informing himself in regard to this subject is unworthy to be a 
citizen of this state, and unfit to cast a ballot” (p. 435). As she puts it to a reporter when making 
the same point, “[Voters] don’t think about it. They won’t discuss it, and they won’t listen to 
those who will discuss it. And when the time comes they will go to the polls and vote their 
prejudices and their whims” (“Anna Howard,” 1915). Likewise, letter-writers for and against 
woman suffrage make visible the norm to vote responsibly. For example, one writes, “Most 
intelligent and responsible men inform themselves through the newspapers and other accessible 
channels as to the state of affairs concerning which they are to cast their votes” (Dunning, 1915), 
and another writes, “No advocate of woman suffrage should lightly regard this forceful editorial 
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arraignment of their cause” (Baker, 1915; see also Beadle, 1915; Gilson, 1915; Harmon-Brown, 
1915; Sykes, 1915; “Vast majority,” 1915). Two newspaper reports display affordances of 
scrutinizing arguments and risks of not doing so. First, scrutinizing arguments affords voters the 
possibility of displaying responsible voting behavior. In the days leading up to the referendum, 
one newspaper report states that “men were generally listening with serious attention” to suffrage 
speeches delivered from automobiles, and that “[e]verywhere there were indications that the 
electors were endeavoring to inform themselves and were disposed to consider the suffrage 
amendment in every light” (“Suffrage campaign,” 1915). Second, voters who do not scrutinize 
arguments risk criticism. In another newspaper report following the defeat of the referendum, 
suffrage advocate Harriot Stanton Blatch concludes that “[s]treet meetings are very ineffective. 
The men stand—not listening—but hypnotized by the sight and sound of a woman making a 
speech” (“Women start triple,” 1915). To avoid criticism for acting on prejudices and whims, or 
for merely gawking at a spectacle, and to display responsible citizenship, voters can take the 
overall message seriously and scrutinize Shaw’s arguments. 
In short, Shaw communicatively designs a context that constrains discounting of the 
message as a whole by (1) stating her intent to persuade men to vote for woman suffrage and 
thereby (2) undertaking an obligation to make a responsible case. These design features change 
the context by creating two reasons to scrutinize her arguments rather than discount her message. 
First, they license voters to presume Shaw would not risk criticism for making a spectacle of 
herself unless she intended to make a responsible case. Second, they make it risky for voters who 
want to display responsible voting behavior to dismiss Shaw’s performance as mere spectacle. 
Voters can avoid the risk and display responsible voting behavior by scrutinizing her arguments. 
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Designing political humor to take seriously 
 In addition to constraining how voters “take” the message as a whole, Shaw designs 
political humor to influence how voters “take” specific humorous arguments. In this section we 
analyze political humor she designs to be taken seriously, and in the following section we 
analyze political humor she designs to be taken as just a joke. In both instances Shaw’s broader 
intent is to influence voters to scrutinize arguments. Designing political humor that was not in 
some sense serious was risky. Advocates for woman suffrage recognized the risks of not acting 
with gravity. One newspaper report of a suffrage parade remarks, “It was no laughing matter, this 
parade. The women in it did not smile or giggle. They were serious and determined. And this 
mental characteristic was contagious. The crowds took the parade seriously, too” (“45,000,” 
1915). Likewise, instructions for how women ought to act at polling places on the day of the 
referendum exhort, “BE DIGNIFIED. BE SERIOUS” (“5,000,” 1915). Moreover, one letter-
writer praises the New York Times anti-suffrage editorialist for treating “the matter neither as a 
joke nor fulsomely prais[ing] the woman suffragists, as some of your contemporaries do” 
(Gilpcke, 1915). Shaw had to design humor that constrained voters from dismissing it with 
impunity as mere buffoonery. 
How does Shaw design humorous ridicule, and why does she expect it to influence 
voters? What obligations does she undertake by ridiculing? Ridicule impugns another person’s 
conduct, so anyone deploying ridicule undertakes some obligation to act fairly. What counts as 
“fair” is a situated judgment, comprising assessments of veracity and propriety within a 
framework of contextual norms. For example, audiences may consider whether the speaker 
ridicules something that others have in fact done, and whether the ridicule is mean-spirited. 
Ridicule may lack persuasive force if there is a failure in higher-order conditions—if speakers 
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ridicule audiences for violating norms the audience does not recognize as normative (Jacobs & 
Jackson, 1993). When a rhetor fails to discharge the obligation to act fairly, the persuasive force 
of their ridicule is diminished, because audiences can dismiss it as untrue or hostile.  
To see how the persuasive force of ridicule is diminished by failing to discharge 
obligations, we first analyze a design that lacks persuasive force. In Shaw’s context serious 
instantiations of the harmful consequences line of argument—that woman suffrage would 
produce harms—were widespread, featured for example in the New York Times editorial. Shaw 
(1915a) designs an instance of ridicule of the harmful consequences line of argument by 
taunting, “The anti-suffragists’ cries are all the cries of little children who are afraid of the 
unborn and are forever crying, ‘The goblins will catch you if you don’t watch out’” (p. 445). By 
deploying ridicule, Shaw undertakes an obligation to act fairly, and this particular design brings 
to bear a norm that listeners will not or ought not take seriously childish statements. But anti-
suffragists did not actually make statements about goblins, so Shaw fails to ridicule with veracity 
and thus fails to discharge the obligation to act fairly. Her taunt can be dismissed with impunity 
as unfair, childish, false mimicry, and buffoonery. 
In contrast, ridicule designed to exaggerate actual actions and statements constrains 
voters from easily dismissing it as unfair hyperbolic mimicry or buffoonery. For example, Shaw 
designs ridicule to influence voters to see inconsistencies in anti-suffrage arguments and in 
denying voting rights to qualified citizens in a republic. Shaw’s intent is clear as she stylistically 
displays at a glance actual inconsistent anti-suffrage lines of argument: “We will either vote as 
our husbands vote or we will not vote as our husbands vote. We either have time to vote or we 
don't have time to vote. We will either not vote at all or we will vote all the time” (Shaw, 1915a, 
p. 452). She displays inconsistencies with humorous ridicule when she asserts, “And then the 
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very one who will tell you that women will vote just as their husbands do will tell you in five 
minutes that they will not vote as their husbands will and then the discord in the homes, and the 
divorce” (p. 447). She ridicules the anti-suffragist from New Jersey who argues that women 
would not use the ballot, and then imagines that if women had the ballot, “we cannot think of 
anything else, we just forget our families, cease to care for our children, cease to love our 
husbands and just go to the polls and vote and keep on voting for ten hours a day 365 days in the 
year, never let up, if we ever get to the polls once you will never get us home, so that the women 
will not vote at all, and they will not do anything but vote” (Shaw, 1915a, p. 447). She ridicules 
anti-suffragists’ use of statistics to prove inconsistent positions. The anti-suffragist from New 
Jersey first argues that it was pointless to give women the ballot, “because if they did have it they 
would not use it, and she had statistics to prove it” (Shaw, 1915a, p. 446). But, Shaw said, “Then 
the young lady, unfortunately for her first argument, proved by statistics, of which she had many, 
the awful results which happened where women did have the ballot; what awful laws have been 
brought about by women's vote” (Shaw, 1915a, p. 447). The design strategy of displaying 
inconsistencies constrains voters from saying they do not see them and affords them the chance 
to display that they are informing themselves and reasoning. “Getting” Shaw’s humor is a 
fallible sign that they see inconsistencies and are scrutinizing arguments. 
Shaw’s metadiscourse indicates her design theory, or why she expects displaying 
inconsistencies to influence voters to scrutinize arguments. She begins the speech by displaying 
the norm to act consistently with dizzying wordplay designed to give invective humorous edges: 
“The difficulty with the men of this country is that they are so consistent in their inconsistency 
that they are not aware of having been inconsistent; because their consistency has been so 
continuous and their inconsistency so consecutive that it has never been broken, from the 
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beginning of our Nation's life to the present time” (Shaw, 1915a, p. 435). Later in the speech she 
states, “Men know the inconsistencies themselves; they realize it in one way while they do not 
realize it in another” (Shaw, 1915a, p. 442). Seeing inconsistencies and acting consistently are at 
the core of Shaw’s performance. Shaw intends to display the inconsistency of a republican 
government, based on citizens’ power to elect representatives, denying voting rights to qualified 
citizens. 
In sum, just as a line divider influences patrons to line up by making visible theater 
personnel’s intent and concomitant obligation to act in accord with norms of queuing, so Shaw’s 
ridicule influences voters to scrutinize arguments by displaying actual inconsistences and 
concomitant obligation to act fairly. Shaw’s design changes the context to create two reasons for 
the audience to scrutinize her arguments. First, the design licenses voters to presume Shaw will 
discharge an obligation to act fairly—in this case to display actual inconsistencies in opponents’ 
arguing—rather than risk criticism for failing to do so. If she fails to discharge the obligation—if 
she unfairly taunts opponents, for example—then voters can dismiss the ridicule with impunity. 
The obligation is reciprocal. So, second, by appreciating Shaw’s humorous ridicule, voters can 
both avoid criticism for failing to see the inconsistencies and display that they are scrutinizing 
arguments. 
 
 Designing political humor to not take seriously 
Shaw also designs ridicule to be taken as just a joke. Perhaps designs that are just jokes 
influence listeners to scrutinize arguments because joking makes the speaker more likeable; 
humor has been associated with source likeability and processing depth (Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, & 
Byrne, 2007). But how does Shaw design humor to influence even individuals who do not like 
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her to scrutinize arguments? Shaw faced just that obstacle; her use of ridicule could be grounds 
for dismissing her message as mean-spirited. One of the first points made in an anti-suffrage 
editorial published one month before the referendum is that suffragists are antagonistic toward 
men (George, 1915). Shaw’s ridicule could be taken as rancor and license voters to dismiss Shaw 
as a woman having a “bee in her bonnet” as she “loses all sense of proportion and sees 
everything through colored glasses” (Wheeler, 1915). In fact, one newspaper describes a core 
argument of “The Fundamental Principle of a Republic” as ridicule delivered scornfully: “Dr. 
Shaw ridiculed the accepted idea of a republican form of government in force in this country, 
asking her hearers in scornful tones, ‘When did any of our states, except those along the Pacific 
Coast, ever hear of a republican form of government?’” (“Dr. Shaw declares,” 1914). Shaw’s 
vulnerability to charges of antagonism is indicated by a letter, printed in the New York Times, 
praising its anti-suffrage editorial for displaying “a rare courage, when you are aware that 
ridicule and unreasonable antagonism will be the consequence of your patriotic efforts” (Baruch, 
1915). The letter writer quotes Shaw calling opponents of equal suffrage “‘that band of anti-
suffragists who go around the country advocating home, heaven, and mother’” and remarks, 
“Would that the rancor now so needlessly exhibited by our opponents were replaced by reason 
and patriotic devotion to the best interests of the people, not to women alone!” (Baruch, 1915). 
How does Shaw design ridicule to constrain audiences from dismissing it as mean-spirited, 
regardless of whether they actually like her? 
Evidence for Shaw’s intent to not antagonize men comes from newspaper interviews and 
another speech. Shaw says she does not want to antagonize men based on their political party: 
“Do not allow it to be said that the women voters are campaigning against the party in power, 
thereby antagonizing that party” (“Women ask,” 1915; see also “Vote fight,” 1915). In an April 
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1915 speech she jokes, “I know that, if you want to convert a man, he must be physically 
comfortable while you are attempting it, so, if any sinner here is uncomfortable, let him come 
and take my seat” (Shaw, 1915b, p. 207). Now consider a part of “The Fundamental Principle of 
a Republic” where Shaw (1915a) ridicules men for fearing their wives would disagree with them 
and vote differently: “Great big overgrown babies! Cannot be disputed without having a row!” 
(p. 448). In isolation, her taunt could be dismissed with impunity as mean and childish. But of 
course Shaw does not ridicule in isolation. She communicatively designs a context that 
constrains listeners from easily dismissing that ridicule as mere rancor. 
First, Shaw (1915a) immediately suggests she is joking: “While we do not believe that 
men are saints, by any means, we do believe that the average American man is a fairly good sort 
of fellow” (p. 448). But that design strategy seems easy enough to dismiss as pandering. So, 
second, she continues by making a humorous prediction that is certainly joking. Just as a line 
divider creates a context where patrons are afforded the chance to display fairness by acting in 
accord with norms of queuing, so the humorous prediction creates a context where voters get 
something from “getting” the humor, namely a chance to display citizenship that is informed, 
capable, unsentimental, savvy.  
 [I]nstead of believing that men and women will quarrel, I think just the opposite thing 
will happen. I think just about six weeks before election a sort of honeymoon will start 
and it will continue until they will think they are again hanging over the gate, all in order 
to get each other’s votes. When men want each other’s votes they do not go up and knock 
them down; they are very solicitous of each other, if they are thirsty or need a smoke, 
or—well we won’t worry about the home. The husband and wife who are quarreling after 
the vote are quarreling now. (Shaw, 1915a, pp. 448-449) 
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Although the prediction is just a joke, what reasons for influence are created by Shaw’s design? 
First, Shaw’s design affords listeners a chance to show that they recognize conventions of 
political reasoning by appreciating the humor. Of course voters could take Shaw’s humor as a 
serious prediction, but if it strains credulity to think they would, that is a testament to how Shaw 
designs the humor to play on conventional political reasoning. Shaw’s position is consonant with 
her point that voters ought to decide how to vote based on the fundamental principle of a 
republic rather than on matters of expediency such as whether woman suffrage would cause 
marital strife. Just as a line divider creates a context that makes it risky for patrons to bypass the 
queue, so Shaw’s humorous prediction creates a context that increases the risk of missing her 
serious point. Failing to appreciate her humor would be a fallible sign of an inability to follow 
her political reasoning. The risk is serious; this kind of failure is displayed in an article about 
Shaw circulated in several newspapers: “Belief that is at the mercy of the winds of expediency is 
not belief; it is mere sham and self deception. Dr. Shaw’s belief in suffrage is real. Her 
consecration to principle is unswerving. The antis cannot understand it” (Young, 1915).2 To 
avoid criticism for lacking the ability to follow political reasoning, and to lay claim to capable 
citizenship, the audience could take the humorous prediction as a joke and see the broader, 
serious point. 
 Second, Shaw’s design affords listeners the chance to display unsentimental reasoning. 
Shaw’s design theory is indicated by metadiscourse as she (1915a, p. 443; see also “Men 
illogical,” 1914) humorously states, “We used to believe that women were the sentimental sex, 
but they can not hold a tallow candle compared with the arc light of the men. Men are so 
sentimental in their attitude about women that they cannot reason about them.” Here, getting the 
joke depends on voters recognizing romantic relationship scripts (Bing & Heller, 2003) 
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involving partners becoming less solicitous of each other over time, but that factor alone does not 
account for whether voters will openly appreciate the humor. Both proponents and opponents of 
woman suffrage charge the opposition with sentimentality and emotional excess. The New York 
Times anti-suffrage editorial asserts that on “the gravest public questions [. . .] men vote 
according to judgments founded on observation and knowledge acquired in the pursuit of their 
daily business. Women would inevitably attempt to decide such matters empirically or 
emotionally” (“The woman suffrage crisis,” 1915). The newspaper prefaces letters in response 
by writing, “It is doubtful whether argument for or against votes for women works many 
conversions. It has become very largely a matter of sentiment, which is mistaken for opinion, and 
sentiment blocks all the ways that lead to reason” (“The Times’s,” 1915). A letter writer reverses 
the charge, accusing the New York Times anti-suffrage editorial of “sentimental obscurantism” 
(Bjorkman, 1915). Shaw’s humorous prediction changes the context to create another reason to 
be influenced: To avoid criticism for holding sentimental attitudes about continuously 
harmonious marriages and to display unsentimental citizenship, voters could take the prediction 
as a joke and scrutinize the serious arguments. 
Finally, Shaw’s design affords listeners a chance to display additional hallmarks of good 
citizenship. Appreciating the humor externalizes an attitude that political machinery is not out of 
bounds as a source of laughter. Shaw nods to political machinery and leverages it to make with a 
wink a humorous argument that as men court each other for votes, so spouses will court each 
other for votes. Openly appearing to “get” the humor affords voters the possibility of laying 
claim to political savvy, avoiding criticism for naïveté about the role of political machinery and 
buying votes with liquor and tobacco, and claiming moral high ground, without appearing 
insufferably righteous, over those who sell their votes. In short, Shaw’s design changes the 
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context to afford voters the possibility of laying claim to what she and the broader culture of 
public talk in newspapers and periodicals point to as hallmarks of good citizenship: enlightened, 
practical, political savvy unmarred by sentimentality, naïveté, and insufferable righteousness. 
Shaw’s humor displays that she acts in accord with those norms of citizenship so generates 
persuasive force for listeners to act in accord with them as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 The designs of political humor that we have analyzed generate persuasive force by 
making visible (1) Shaw’s intent and (2) concomitant, reciprocal obligation to act in accord with 
some norm. In the first example, Shaw openly intends to persuade voters to vote “yes,” 
undertaking and discharging an obligation to advocate responsibly, and therefore pressuring 
voters to decide responsibly by scrutinizing arguments. In the second example, Shaw openly 
intends to ridicule anti-suffrage arguments. When her design fails to discharge an obligation to 
act fairly—when it is merely a childish taunt—it lacks persuasive force. Listeners can dismiss it 
with impunity as buffoonery. But when her design points to inconsistencies in actual anti-
suffrage arguments—when Shaw undertakes and discharges an obligation to act consistently and 
fairly herself—the design changes the context to create reasons for voters to see the 
inconsistencies and act consistently. In the third example, Shaw intends a taunt to be taken as a 
joke. She does not openly state that intent but undertakes an obligation to ridicule fairly, with 
veracity and propriety. She designs the message to pressure listeners to take it as just a joke by 
making a humorous prediction. If voters take the prediction seriously, Shaw could say, “Just 
joking” with impunity and, further, “You are sentimental, naïve, insufferable.” The design—like 
all designs—changes the context, in this instance affording voters the possibility of displaying 
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good citizenship. Openly appreciating her political humor is a fallible sign that they are 
scrutinizing her arguments—that they see when she is joking, they see inconsistent reasoning, 
they see a serious intent to persuade. Shaw’s designs constrain them from acting otherwise by 
making it risky to do so. 
 The basic model of the persuasive force of political humor explains how specific design 
strategies influence even individuals short on motivation or ability to coordinate their public 
actions as the speaker intends while respecting their autonomy. The model distributes agency 
between speaker and audience because it comprises reasoning on both sides of the transaction. 
Metadiscourse indicates speakers’ reasoning about how they expect listeners to reason. First, 
design strategies license audiences to presume the speaker would not undertake an obligation to 
act in accord with some norm unless they intended to act in accord with it. Second, at the same 
time, design strategies influence audiences to act in accord with the norm by making it risky for 
them to ignore, disregard, or flaunt it; and by affording them the chance to display good 
character for acting in accord with it. In short, a speaker can design political humor that creates 
reasons for audiences to not discount the message and to allocate cognitive resources for 
scrutinizing the message and arguments. By undertaking and discharging obligations, the designs 
hold all participants in the transaction accountable for acting in accord with norms. 
 The need for visibility and accountability is clear from the referendum results. The defeat 
of woman suffrage in New York in 1915 was a turning point as militant and radical suffragists 
such as Harriot Stanton Blatch “could not go back to the simple democratic appeal, to ask men 
one by one to extend justice to women” (DuBois, 1997, p. 181). As one suffragist puts it, “The 
public has all the education it can stand on this subject. Personally, I never want to hear another 
suffrage speech again” (Bugbee, 1915). Instead, they advocate for a federal amendment. Stanton 
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Blatch states the rationale to a reporter following the referendum defeat: “We can’t follow up an 
individual voter, but we can one in a legislative body” (“Mrs. Blatch,” 1915; DuBois, 1997). 
Carrie Chapman Catt responds to Stanton Blatch, “The man on the street is the sovereign of this 
state. You are his subjects. Unless you have his backing you cannot appeal to legislative bodies 
which he creates” (“Women raise,” 1915, p. 7). But she adds, “If, however, the man on the street 
does not respond quickly enough, if the men he represents do not grant our demands soon, we 
shall go into politics ourselves and elect men who will do what we demand” (“Women raise,” 
1915, p. 7). Even Catt acknowledges the need to supplement moral suasion with a mechanism of 
visibility and accountability. 
 Our account explains why the persuasive force of political humor is diminished if social 
actors can dodge accountability. If speakers can disclaim a serious intent to influence or 
audiences can disclaim awareness of norms, then reasons for influence are absent. It is precisely 
this wiggle room that may make it difficult for researchers to analyze the persuasive effects of 
political humor, especially in contexts where both sources and receivers may be able to plausibly 
deny a serious intent and discount a message as just an entertaining joke, and where they are not 
held accountable for living up to obligations and norms that design strategies bring to bear in a 
situation. This is not to say that such deployments of humor do not influence individuals’ 
attitudes, beliefs, values, and so on. But our account explains how speakers make special efforts 
to design political humor to forestall discounting and influence public action, and provides a 
theory-based rationale for designs of political humor. Future research could investigate 
contemporary political humor designed to influence audiences to perform other kinds of actions, 
and triangulating our account. For example, it would be possible to collect interview data to 
ascertain whether and to what degree social actors hold and deploy the tacit knowledge and 
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principles comprising a normative pragmatic account of the persuasive force of political humor. 
 Our study best accounts for political humor where speakers actually make arguments, and 
has theoretical and analytical implications for addressing the broader challenge of influencing 
listeners to scrutinize arguments in natural environments where various factors may interact in 
significant ways (Becker, 1971; Jeong & Hwang, 2012; Weber, Westcott-Baker, & Anderson, 
2013), and where manipulating factors in order to influence may backfire if listeners feel 
manipulated by messages that do not respect their autonomy (Burgoon et al., 2002; Quick et al., 
2013). Rather than assuming situations comprise stable factors, normative pragmatic theories 
explain how social actors communicatively design the very grounds of transactions to mitigate 
the influence of unfavorable motivational and ability factors, and respect listeners’ autonomy. 
Strategies create reasons: “a local ‘normative terrain’” (Goodwin, 2007, p. 85) communicatively 
designed to “enhance people’s capacity to choose when to engage in such argumentative 
scrutiny” (O’Keefe, 1995, p. 13). In contrast to communication theories that predict what 
message factors may influence humans generally or what broad functions strategies may perform 
for some listeners, normative pragmatic theories analyze ordinary, ingenious ways social actors 
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